In a historical context clearly marked by an agrarian structure based on large estates (haciendas) that was imposed on indigenous communities and small producers, the Agrarian Reform of 1969 succeeded in reverting the properties of large landowners (12 million hectares) and distributing them to around 600 cooperative farms (10 million hectares). However, 20 years later, within the neoliberal policies of the 1990s, the normative framework that allowed this important action was changed, eliminating the safeguards of agrarian property. The main tool for this was the Political Constitution of the State (1993), which guarantees the right of all persons (whether natural or legal) to access and preserve agrarian property, without any demands regarding the use of such property or the extension of land. The other instrument was Law 26.505 on the Promotion of Investment in Economic Activities in the Lands of National Territory and of Peasant and Native Communities, or Land Law (1995), which ruled out the limitations on the use and disposal of agricultural land, such as, for example, the principle that the land belongs to those who work it, the prohibition of latifundios, the need to eliminate minifundios, the concept of the social function of agrarian property, and the need to establish a size limit to large property. Thus, it allowed the free transfer and any modality of rights transfer over land; additionally, greater security was provided to large landowners.

An important policy of recent years has been to enable unproductive lands (tierras eriazas) on the Peruvian coast, previously confiscated by the state (and sometimes affecting the rights of producers and communities) by allocating large state investments in irrigation megaprojects. These lands are then auctioned to the highest bidder and, therefore, end up in the hands of large companies and economic groups, without benefiting the peasant sector. These lands are being used for the production of crops such as sugar cane and African palm for the production of agro-fuels.

In this context, where the concentration of land is no longer controlled—and in fact is promoted—the situation of relative equity in land tenure that had been achieved with the Agrarian Reform of 1969 has been reversed by land grabs. Currently, about 80% of agricultural units in Peru have less than 5 hectares and control 6% of the total national agricultural area. At the same time, agricultural units with more than 500 hectares are only 0.3 % of the total, but they amount to approximately 70% of the country's agricultural area.

There are important issues for peasants and native communities, such as legal security (land title clearing) that the state does not consider to be relevant. There is no prioritization of programs for the formalization of property, despite the fact that for decades it has been a pending issue on the state agenda and that of peasant organizations. Much more critical is the situation of native communities, since their territories often overlap with mining, hydrocarbon and forestry concessions and, for that reason, their rights are not formally recognized. The causes of this are the lack of state will, the absence of a comprehensive cadaster system for rural property, and the existence of outdated regulatory frameworks.

On the other hand, there are several mechanisms of land concentration in Peru: free market, state intervention in projects favorable to agribusiness, irrigation projects, extractive industries, control of water for irrigation. Peru has made a major leap toward export agriculture, hand in hand with land grabbing by large economic groups, and the state has played a fundamental role in supporting these corporations and companies through making the land tenure system more flexible, creating subsidies, lowering taxes and investing in state capital.