This paper describes the outcomes of the Kimberley Process, which aims to create a certification system for rough diamonds, so excluding illicit diamonds, which fuel conflict, from the global diamond trade.The author focuses on the provisions the process has made for monitoring certified diamonds. He provides an overview of the monitoring provisions of the Kimberley Process as agreed at its March 2002 Ottawa meeting. The paper compares these with the monitoring provisions in other international agreements, and rates them against the problems the Kimberley Process aims to resolve, arguing that much stronger measures will be required if the agreement is to be credible and effective.The document contains a proposal for ‘essential elements’ of an effective and credible Kimberley process monitoring system. And it concludes that if such a system is not adopted, the Kimberley Process will create a false sense of security, allowing conflict diamonds to continue entering the system, ultimately placing the entire diamond industry at risk. [adapted from author]
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