This paper analyze the colonial institutions set up by the British to collect land revenue in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments, agricultural productivity and investments in public goods in the post-Independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. It has been verified that these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity of the historical institutions, and argue that they probably arise because differences in institutions lead to very different policy choices. [Working Paper No. 003] British, India, historical, landlords, agricultural, investments, independence, policy choices, history, land tenure, development
Auteurs et éditeurs
Abhijit Banerjee
Lakshmi Iyer
Fournisseur de données
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